Nase Novine, March 09, 1977

              I
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V January
BY by delta press, 1973.
The Ustashl movement was born
as a result of the separatist aspira-tions
of a small part of the Croatian
bourgeoisie, whose roots came
from the (Josip) Frank "Party of
Rights". At the same time the
socio-politic- al development in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was
hit by the sharpening of Serbo-Croatia- n
relations and the appearance
of extreme ideas and organizati-ons,
as well as the revisionist
tendencies emerging in internati-onal
relations, made it possible for
the movement to grow and enter
the service of nazism and fascism.
Since the standard-bearer- s and
ideologists of the Ustashi move-ment
came from the ranks of
Frank's "Party of Rights", they
failed to form an Ustashi organi-zation
within the country in 1928.
This was because they already
exhibited a separatist conception
of a solution to the "Croatian
question", while the Croatian
peasantry was largely under the
influence of the Croatian Peasant
Party which did not favor the
separation of Croatia from Yugo-slavia
but wanted greater rights for
the Croatian bourgeoisie. Thus,
without the broad support of the
Croatian people, and prevention by
the regime, Pavelic and his
collaborators were unable to
develop successfully their Greater
Croatia separatist activities in
Yugoslavia but carried them abroad
where they worked as emigres.
The Ustashi found refuge and
support in fascist Italy, Boris's
Bulgaria, Horthy's Hungary, Aus-tria
and Nazi Germany — countries
which had territorial pretensions
against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
either based on the San Stefano
and London Treaties or as
revisionist claims.
Pavelic and the emigres around
him, as the proponents of a
separatist conception of a solution
to the "Croatian Question", a
conception which became more
significant with the appearance
and strengthening of revisionist
tendencies in International rela-tions,
was especially acceptable to
Fascist Italy, which became the
main base for the assembling,
organization and terroristic activi-ties
of the Croatian separatists
against the Yugoslav state.
Within the framework of Musso-lini's
expansionist policy toward
the Balkans, Fascist Italy was
ready to offer support to any action
directed toward the dissolution of !
Yugoslavia. In this connection, It
was in Italy, in 1930, and under the
Italian wing, that Pavelic succe-eded,
in an sense,
in establishing his movement,
while somewhat later he produced
an docu-ment
— Constitution and Princi-ples
— which set forth the
structure, program
and ideology of the movement.
Having already, earlier, assisted
12, 1977
A
- -
the Macedonian separatist and
terrorist, Vance Mihailov, Italy, in
accepting the Ustashi, became the
most active accessory of the extre-mist
movement within Yugoslavia.
With the aim of further expan-ding
and the Ustashi
organization, Pavelic, assisted by
special emissaries, tried to carry
his activities into some other
countries. In addition to Italy,
therefore, Ustashi centers were
formed in four European countries
and in South and North America,
and for contact with Yugoslavia,
three acceptance stations (Zadar,
Rijekaand Trieste). Through these
centers and stations Ustashi
propaganda was circulated and
people recruited for Ustashi
military camps that were formed in
Italy and Hungary.
While the numerical strength of
the armed Ustashi in the military
camps in Hungary ranged from a
few men to around 110, those in
Italy numbered between 24 and 340
prior to the assassination in Mar-seilles.
And when, after the
Ustashi from Hun-gary,
Belgium and the Netherlands
moved to Italy, their total number
was over 500. Between 1937 and
1939, however, when around 260
adherents of the Ustashi organiza-tion
were repatriated to Yugosla-via,
it left only around 250 in Italy
where they remained until April
1941.
Having no mass political support
in the Croatian national movement,
the Ustashi was transformed into a
terrorist organization in the service
of Italy against Yugoslavia. In the
terrorist activities of the Ustashi
organization, which began in 1929,
two actions are important: the
so-call- ed Velebit uprising and the
Marseilles assassination.
Meanwhile, seeing that terrorist
actions did not produce the desired
results, and because of the
prohibition of their activities
abroad, from 1934 on the Ustashi
directed their activities to propa-ganda
and
within the country.
Through his better known sup-porters,
Pavelic tried to take
advantage of the atmosphere of the
time in Croatia and in Bosnia and
Hercegovina in order to win over
extremist elements both from the
ranks of the Croatian Peasant Party
and from other organizations.
Thus, in the period from 1936 to
1939 three Ustashi centers were
formed from which Ustashi activi-ties
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
were directed. The first, and main,
Ustashi center was in Zagreb, the
second in Sarajevo and the third in
Osijek. , With the arrival, in 1939, of
around 260 emigres in Yugoslavia,
the number of organized Ustashi in
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovi-na
Increased, but they remained on
the level of an illegal terrorist
organization because the Ustashi
531111 I
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FROM STUDY MLADEN COLIC published
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organizational
organizational-progra- m
organizational
strengthening
assassination,
organizational streng-thening
movement within the country
continued to be directed toward
the so-call- ed sworn Ustashi
included in various Catholic,
student and other similar organiza-tion,
and the Ustashi society
"Uzdanica".
In order to break more easily and
quickly the Yugoslav military
resistance and create the most
favorable conditions for the esta-blishment
of the occupation
system, Germany, during the Nazi
and Fascist aggression in Yugos-lavia,
with the assistance of its
secret representative in Zagreb,
Edmund Verzenmeier, arranged the
proclamation of the Independent
State of Croatia through the Croat,
and agent of the German Intell-igence
Service, Slavko Kvaternik.
Into this created Independent
State of Croatia, the Italians and
Germans brought from Italy Pavelic
and his Ustashi and handed over
authority to them. Upon the
establishment of "their own"
authority in the Independent State
of Croatia, the Ustashi became just
ordinary servants and hirelings of
Germany and Italy and the most
ruthless organizers and executors
of Nazi plans for racial discrimi-nation
and the extermination of
Communists, Serbs, Jews, Gyp-sies
and all anti-Fascis- ts in Croatia
and Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Mines and forests were handed
over for exploitation by the
occupation forces; the land rema-ined
in the hands of the big
landowners and the church, while
the people were subjected to
ruthless plunder by the occupation
and Ustashi regimes. The life of
the workers was very hard. By
persecuting and killing Commu-nists
and other outstanding prog- ressive workers and trades union
functionaries, the Ustashi tried to
obtain control and a leading role in
the workers' movement. As early as
May they began sending a labor
force for work in Germany,
while all the costs of the
occupation forces were borne bv
the "Independent State of Croatia".
By order of the Germans and
Italians, the Ustashi sent around
8,000 soldiers to the eastern front
as components of the German and
Italian forces, to fight against the
Red Army, while in December 1941
they declared war on the United
States and Great Britain.
In creating the "Independent
State of Croatia", the German and
Italian policy of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia as a state was realized,
while satisfying the territorial
aspirations of Greather Croatian
separatism by including in the
"Independent State of Croatia"
also the territories of Bosnia and
Hercegovina and Srem, was
supposed to strengthen the Axis
position in that part of the Balkans
and transform the new "state" into
a component part of the polltical--econom- ic
system of the Third
Reich.
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Leaving to the Ustashi the orga-nization
of authority on its
occupied territory of Croatia,
Bosnia, Hercegovina and Srem,
Germany wanted to engage its
forces as little as possible to
achieve the maximum In attaining
its military-politic- al and eccono-mi- c
goals in this part of
Yugoslavia. Germany ensured Its
influence and control over the
"Independent State of Croatia"
through Its military representative
with the armed forces; also
through Its various Instructive
organs which had helped construct
the "Independent State of Croatia",
beginning with the armed forces all
the way to the university. So that
they could consolidate without
hindrance their occupation posi-tion,
the Germans established a
network of their institutions "in
agreement" with the Ustashi
government which, "togethor" with
the armed forces of the "Indepen-dent
State of Croatia" and tho
entire "state" apparatus were to
secure the interests of the German
occupiers. They succeeded In
obtaining "legal and political"
support for all their measures and
intentions in Ustashi "laws" and
Ustashi "decrees". As early as
April 1941, units of the German
Intelligence Service were establi-shed
in the "Independent State of
Croatia", which placed the Ustashi
regime, and everything of interest
to the Germans, under their
supervision.
Following the German example,
the Italians also established their
institutions In the "Independent
State of Croatia", but they were not
so numerous or so influential on
the internal political and economic
situation as were the Germans. The
BHHIIHIBIH
Andrija Artukovi6 (responsible for murder of hundreds of thousands of
people) and other Ustashi leaders greet their Nazi masters
Italians, through their strong
military units, carried out their
occupation policy, and did not
need a broader network ol their
institutions. When they became
convinced that the Germans had
the deciding word in the "Ind-ependent
State of Croatia", the
Italians began to give open support
to the Chetnlks in Bosnia, Herce-govina
and Dalmatia, seeing in
them backing for the realization ol
their expansionist aims in the
"Independent State of Croatia".
The government of the "Inde-pendent
State of Croatia" and Ante
Pavelic showed their activity in
simply carrying out tho orders
directives and suggestions oi
responsible Gorman and Italian
men In Zagreb (the German envoy
and General Horstenau, on tho one
hand, and the Italian envoy
Casertano and General on the
other). Nothing could, or was
permitted to, be done without the
knowledge and permission of those
men.
While Germany's prime interest
in the "Independent State of
Croatia" was its strategic position
In tho Balkans, Its use as a source
of raw materials and labor force,
and the possibility of forming
legionary military formations as
part of the German armed forces,
Italy, in addition, tried to draw the
"Independent State of Croatia" as
much аз possible into sphero of
interest In order to achieve more
easily its expansionist plans In the
Balkans.
The "Independent State of
Croatia", therefore, was nothing
but an artificial creation whose
"authority" depended primarily on
the needs and wishes of the
occupiers. From time to time this
authority was stressed, but only
declaratively, while in practice it
never attained expression. It was
all merely to serve the interests of
the occupiers.
The Axis powers, however,
interpreted the establishment of
the "Independent State of Croatia"
as an expression of the people's
aspiration for self-determinati- on,
even though it was clear and
known to everyone that there could
be no talk of the people's will, but
that the proclaimed "state" was
made with the help of the armed
forces of the aggressors during war
operations against Yugoslavia. The
"Independent State of Croatia",
therefore, was set up merely for the
needs of the occupiers to facilitate
their occupation, while its status
of "statehood" was the product of
Axis aggression on Yugoslavia.
With regard to the so-call- ed
"sovereignty" of the "Independent
State ol Croatia", and the Third
Reich's concern for it, it should be
borne in mind that it demonstrated
the wish of the Third Reich, or of
Hitler, to show to the Tripartite
Pact that, to some degree, it did
acknowledge the existence of
"independent states" In its camp
and took care of their "indepen-dence".
This was intended mainly
for the public of the Axis camp,
and propaganda for the world,
rather than any concern whatever
for the actual regime of the
"Independent State of Croatia".
It is not possible in this work to
give a detailed description of the
Ustashi regime and social-politic- al
system, but from all that has been
said about the Internal policy of the
Ustashi, it Is clear that in order to
give the best possible help to their
German and Italian masters, they
supported the Germans and
Italians in idological, political,
social and racial views, associating
themselves with the Nazi and
Fascist axiom, "one nation, one
state, one leader". Enough has
been said to show that this system
was constructed under the direct
influence of the German and Italian
Nazi-Fasci- st systems and that it
represented the application of
those systems to local conditions
in the "Independent State of
Croatia". In brutal terror and mass
crimes, in bloodthirstiness and
sadism, Nazism and Fascism, in
their Ustashi form in the "Indepen-dent
State of Croatia, as early as
1941 reached their German and
Italian level.
Pavelic and the Ustashi conduc-ted
this criminal and actually
insane policy against one-thir- d of
the population of the "Independent
State of Croatia" in order thus to
carry out the perfidious policy of
Berlin and Rome who tried to
weaken as much as possible, and
tixtorminate, both Serbs and
Croats through fratricidal war, and
thus finally secure this part of
Yugoslavia for themselves. The
other side of this policy was to be
conducted by the other servants of
Rome and Berlin — the Chetniks of
Draza Mihailovic, by massacring
Croats and Moslems.
The Ustashi movement itself, as
the most extreme and best
organized represenistive of Greater
Croatian separatism, was not a
united political group, but conta-ined
two clearly defined wings: the
radical and the "moderate". The
first was comprised of Ustashi who
had spent many years as emigres
and who were schooled in various
terrorist camps in Italy and
Hungary, and who were fanatical
and hungary for power. The other
wing consisted of people who had
spent the greater part of their lives
in the country, had belonged to
bourgeois or petit-bourgeo- is circ-les,
and were less inclined toward
radical political measures and
open crime. However, the differen-ce
between the two wings was
merely a question of method.
A separate group consisted of
officers from ,the ranks of the
Croatian bourgeoisie and elements
from the remants of the Croatian
aristocracy. To this also belonged
conservative middle-clas- s groups
who had retained their old
sympathies for the former Austria--Hungar- y.
These circles with
separatist and anti-Yugosl- av lea-nings,
although not Ustashi, cordi-ally
accepted the "Independent
State of Croatia". They criticized
the regime, considering that the
Ustashi were too immature to
govern the state, that they were
uncultured hooligans and oppor-tunists.
However, they served that
regime, accepting from Pavelic
positions and decorations, titles
and awards. They saw in the Third
Reich a kind of heir to the
Habsburg Monarchy.
A special category was the petit--bourgeo- is
leadership of the
Croatian Peasant Party, beginning
with Dr. Macek and going down to
various village functionaries of the
party. All of them largely accepted
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
the establishment of a separate
L "Croatian State", but at the same
time they felt that authority should
belong to them, with only a few
Ustashi temporarily with them. That
is why a considerable number of
the members of the Croatian
Peasant Party joined the Ustashi
organization, others were in sharp
opposition to the Ustashi regime,
while a relatively small number
joined the National Liberation
Movement.
The leadership of the Catholic
Church in the "Independent State
of Croatia", led by Archbishop Dr.
Aloysius Stepinac, and the Saraje-- .
vo Archbishop, Ivan Saric, welco-med
the "Independent State of
Croatia" with open arms. They thus
gave the initial impetus to the
Ustashi to settle accounts on
religious and nationalist bases
through the crime of genocide.
Finally, as a separate but
important group, mention should
be made of the Moslem reactionary
circles of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
Accepting without objection the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, a small
part identified with the Ustashi,
while the majority tried to achieve
their own autonomous and separa-tist
plans, even when they were
directed against the "wholeness"
of the "Independent State of
Croatia".
There were also other various
elements in the leading stratum of
the Ustashi "Independent State of
Croatia". But, regardless of all the
complexities of these reactionary
and petit-bourgeo- is elements, they '
were united in their anti-commun- ist
and generally anti-peop- le
character, in separatism and the
idea, of the dissolution of Yugos-lavia.
They differed only in details
of concept, and especially in who
should have the right to exclusive
authority.
The complex structure of the
leadership of the "Independent
State of Croatia", divided on
details and united on principles,
found representatives of the
German and Italian occupation
forces whose concept was also
uniform only in principle. Their
belief that the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and the establishment
of a Quisling state apparatus and
regime would secure and consoli-date
the occupation system,
experienced, already In 1941, the
biggest defeat precisely in the
"Independent State of Croatia".
Just as the National Liberation
uprising continued to spread,
threatening the interests of the
January 12,
Franjo Racki:
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin
Hrvatski narod je imao i dobrih sve-cenik- a.
Jedan od njih bio je Franjo
Racki, koji je pomagao osnovati
Jugoslavensku akademiju znanosti i
umjetnosti. Donosimo izvod iz njego-vo- g
govora na prvoj svecanoj sjednici
Akademije odrzane u Zagrebu 28. juia
1867.
Priznavajuc dakle mi juzni Slovjeni, da su djela
uma jos slavnija od juna6kih, snidosmo i na
popriste umnoga napredka. Pa zasto da se
plasimo ove nove borbe, koji se табет u ruci
borili za najuzviseniju ideju? Hi zar nije nas narod i
u prosvjeti njekada koracao uzpored drugim
narodima? — Nasa se stara knjiga neima stiditi
pred licem svojih vrsnjakinja: ako imade
byzantinska knjizevnost svoje cuvene chronog ra-te,
imade srbska srednjega vieka svoje Ijeto — i
zivotopisci ?s preporodom humanizma na zapadu
udomio se bolji ukus u hrvatskom pjesnictvu
dalmatinskom i dubrovackom; doba Ariosta u
Italiji porodila nam je "bozanstvenoga" Marulica,
duh Torquata Tassa nadahnuo je nasega Ivana
Gundulica. Dapace — sto nam je romanska knjiga
i umjetnost dala, odvratismo joj davsi za uhar
nase Crievice, Klovije, Boskovice i Medulice,
Baglivije i Vranjanine.
Akademija imade po svojem ustrojstvu
njegovati znanost i umjetnost. ..AH ona nece gojiti
znanosti u pravcu idealnom nego obzirom na
potrebe i korist naSega naroda i nase domovirre.
Prema tomu nastojat ce akademija, dasakupi I
jezikoslovnomu sudu podvrgne sve blago nasega
jezika, bilo ono sahranjeno u ustima na§ega
naroda i odazivalo se u puc.kim pjesmah, prifiah I
poslovicah, bio ono ubiljezeno u dobrih starih i
novih knjiga.
Jednakim trudom izpitivati ce akademija
zemlju, na kojoj na§ narod zivi, i to ne samo da
iznese u njoj zakopane starine, pak tim u trag ude
tajnam proslosti; nego da prouci i njezinu
povrsinu i njezinu utrobu, pak tim odkrije sredsiva
narodnoga blagostanja, olahko ti sadasnjosi i
obezbiedi buducnost narodnu...Zatodrzat ce si za
duznost podupirati svaki podhvat u zemljopisu i
zemljoslovju, prirodopisu i prirodoslovlju naSe
blagoslovljene, nad sve nam mile Jugoslavije.
Misao, koja je jugoslavensku akademiju
osnovala, bjeta: da ona bude ognjistem knjizevne
radnje juznih Slovjena, nebi li se s vremenom u
njem sakupili i ujedinili traci, koje sada Salje
dusevna moc plemena hrvatsko-srbskog- a, slove-nskog- a
i bugarskoga. Ova misao, sjedinjuju6a
jugoslovenska plemena, voditi ce sveudilj naSu
akademiju poput ognjena stupa u toj pustinji, te
6e ju 6uvati od zablude, obmane i obsjene.
occupation forces, so the Ustashi
regime of the "Independent State
of Croatia" weakened, as did the
occupation system in general; it
completely disappeared on the
liberated territory, while in other
areas it barely existed thanks
primarily to the occupation troops
and institutions of the German and
Italian occupiers. Their endeavors
to put down the "unrest" in the
"Independent State of Croatia" by
the usual measures of the
occupation apparatus and the
engagement of Ustashi-Quislin- g
forces with the aim of turning the
uprising into a fratricidal and civil
war, did not produce the expected
results. Germany and Italy were
compelled to reconcile themselves
to the fact that in occupied
Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia
and Croatia, they faced a new war
front which they had not planned.
1977
smo
Pobjegao usta§ki
atentator
Bonn —Prema saopcenju keln-sk- e
policije iz istrainog zatvora je
pobjegao ustaski terorista Pavie
Perovlc, jedan od sudionika aten-tat- a
na jugoslavenskog vice-konzu-- la
u Disseldorfu, Vladimira Topica.
Kao Sto je javljeno Pavie Perovl6
je 28. juna 1976. godine sudjelovao
u muckom napadu na jugoslaven-skog
konzularnog 6lnovnika pred
samom zgradom konzulata, ispali-v- si
cetiri hica iz revolvera koji su,
medutim, promaslll cilj. On i
njegov saucesnik Marko Krpan
uspjeli su pobjeel s mjesta napada,
all je pollcija blokirala okolne ulice
i za kratko vrijeme bill su uhapSeni.
Otada se Perovl6 I njegov sauces-nik
nalaze u istralnom zatvoru
zbog pokusaja ubojstva.